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pins, 2) a rapid coolant ejection mechanism, and 3) neglect of fuel motion prior to the core disassembly phase.
\

Subsequent early tests in the TREAT reactor revealed ihat substantial
fuel motion occurs upon pin failure, and the essence o f these observations was incorporated in our analysis at the time the Design Safety Assessment document was .written. Most o f our work over the last year or so has been to refine these analyses, and to more directly compare our models to experimental results from the TREAT reactor. This work has continued to give us confidence that the unprotected transient overpower accident in the FFTF is a fairly benign event.
Rather than go into detail with regard to specific baseline calculations, however, I felt it might be more beneficial--for the purpose of this meeting--to step back a moment and try to take an overview I _ --o f the entire envelope o f potential TOP concerns. topics which are believed to be relevant to this end.
--_/----
The first VU-GRAPH is included to summarize the . ' and H-series.data, and its relevance to the questions of axial failure location and hydraulic fuel sweepout.
As a result of some of the ambiguities yet remaining from the experimental data, I will then focus attention on some preliminary calculations performed wherein total blockage of localized pin regions i s assumed--both for irradiated and for fresh core conditions.
-___ ----L . -____..__ -. - Finally, I would like to draw some conclusions from this combined analytical/experimental base to place into better perspective the role of the unprotected TOP accident for FFTF-HCDA.considerations. focus will be on the case which can be made for early accident termination and in-place cooling.
Here, the cBased upon this assessment, I then plan to point out that even under conditions of extreme improbability, the TOP accident is bounded by the energy release numbers already calculated for the Loss of Flow Accident.
BASE TOP ANALYSIS
The next VU-GRAPH summarizes the expected behavior for the unprotected
TOP.
1) First, having postulated an external reactivity input source and assumed that the protectivg system fails, the ultimate mode of shutdown must be via theavenue of fuel failure and eventual fuel rsmoval. In this regard, there exists substantial evidence--both analytically and experimentally, that failure of the pins will 'occur well above the core centerline--particularly for those pins containing a.significant amount of molten fuel at the time of failure. 2) The subsequent fuel/coolant dynamics process then ensueing is expected t o lead to a rapid neutronics shutdown, and 3) a non-energetic fuel dispersal.
Hence, 4) overall accident termination occurs with an essentially intact core. Now, what are the key assumptions imbedded in this scenario? The following VU-GRAPH is included to address that question.
3)
4)
First, the assumption is made that, indeed, axial failure locations will be well above the axial core midplane. Secondly, on the question of failure incoherency, there are two major areas, i.e. , failure incoherency between subassemblies (which are included, at least to a limited degree), and failure incoherency within subassemblies (which we have previously ignored). latter factor is, in fact, potentially very importnat as I hope to make clear later in the discussion. Third, based on early TREAT results, all nominal calculations are based on the assumption that a considerable amount of fuel is hydraulically swept out of the active core region by the coolant. the ambiguity of some of the more recent TREAT results, however, we do not assume all mobile fuel reaching the coolant' channel is cleanly swept out--in fact, of the order of 50% i s normally assumed to remain behi nd .
Finally, we have to make some assumptions with regard to the magnitude o f the reactivity insertion mechanism which initiates the accident. might be worth reminding you that in the case of the FFTF, the peak reactivity insertion rate achievable by withdrawing the most reactive rod at the maximum rate of withdrawal is only about 3t/sec. In the PSAR, the base case was constructed around a 50dlsec insertion accident, i.e., a ramp rate over an order of magnitude larger than that deemed possible from any physical movement of a given subassembly,,and even larger rates were investigated. limited by a few t/sec to a few $/sec, as shown on this VU-GRAPH, for a total insertion o f approximately 4 to 5 dollars.
This
In recognition of
It
The range o f interest is then certainly
The next VU-GRAPH is included to help place the overall TOP potential accident sequence into perspective in a fashion somewhat parallel to that which Hans Fauske of ANL provided for the LOF accident.
VU-GRAPH will help to focus the importance of the key assumptions outlined on the previous VU-GRAPH.
Hopefully, thfs
You will note several possible accident paths, but they are -not a1 1 considered to have the same probabi 1 iey. numbers are not available, we have used the same procedure as adopted A1 though probabil i ty r by Dr. Fauske t o include a l l general p a t h s leading to the ultimate question of post-acciden t heat removal (PAHR) , b u t have h i g h 1 ighted the expected--or most probable path--by the heavy arrows, i.e., the p a t h around the l e f t side of the figure. In f a c t , the path to the r i g h t i s predicated on axial centerline f a i l u r e and, as you will note, this hypothesis leads quite directly t o a classical case of mechanical core disassembly--particularly i f p l u i g i n g i n the coolant channel i s also assumed. I t i s possible t h a t even w i t h such a postulated failure location that fuel sweepout would slow down the accident sequence sufficiently t o allow early termination without hydrodynamic disassembly. However, any sequence down the right-hand side i s regarded as h i g h l y improbable because of the very substantial analytical and experimental evidence supporting a high axial failure location.
You will note that the path around the l e f t describes the expected behavior i n accordance w i t h my e a r l i e r remarks. The probability of substantial fuel sweepout appears quite h i g h for failed fuel which has been pre-irradiated, since the cladding will f a i l prior t o the time o f massive melt fractions i n the pins. pins is n o t so strong, due to the combined situation of a h i g h melt fraction a t failure and the possibility of a locally voided coolant channel (resulting from b o i l i n g ) acting as a receptacle for expelled fuel. I t is possible that a considerable amount of localized plugging near or slightly above the rupture . s i t e would occur for fresh fuel. As will be noted from a l a t e r VU-GRAPH,
I
however, any plugging would be expected t o be confined t o the central 50-70% of the pins w i t h i n the failed subassembly; hence, substantial by pass flow around the outer 2 or 3 rows of p i n s would provide peripheral cooling and allow an early accident termination--even without a n y hydraulic sweepout a t a l l ! T h i s is most important point; one t o which I will return i n l a t e r discussions. To summarize, the only path we can envision i n which the TOP accident 1) Total plugging takes place, o r 2) A pluq a t the radial center of the subassembdies propagates t o the hex can walls prior to neutronics shutdown. In either case it 3wn of the core, is possible to envision .e., entering ,he trans a sequence leading to a gradual tion phase, in a manner similar to that of the LOF. patterns should be localized--due to the marked difference in failure conditions for differing fuel types. Remember that the pumps are still on in this case, and a reduction in power will allow unfailed regions of the core to be cooled far more effectively than in the LOF situation.
Even in this case, however, it should be noted that plugging This brings us then to our key questions, as shown in the next VU-GRAPH:
1) The case which can be made for axial failure locations well above the core midplane,
2) The extent of fuel plateout or plugging in the coolant channel, and
3) The fresh core. Here as was pointed out earlier, the major concern is that of plugging since--as will be noted later in the discussion--this core configuration has the highest propensity of discharging large amounts of molten fuel into a largely dry coolant channel.
EXPERIMENTAL DATA
In an attempt to address these major questions, I would like to turn to the experimental data base which we now have in hand. The following VU-GRAPH summarizes results from the tests most relevant to the TOP accident sequence. The H-series tests were conducted to simulate a 50&/sec ramp insertion and the E-series tests were driven somewhat harder to simulate a 3$/sec ramp insertion. H2 and E4 were fresh pins whereas the remaining tests all contained at least ' one irradiated pin. by six peripheral fresh pins, whereas E7 and E8 had a full complement of seven irradiated pins.
H5, H4, and E6 had a central irradiated pin surrounded
The first major question in the analysis, as you recall, was that of -axial failure location. Although it is difficult in some of these tests to designate the precise axial failure location, certainly in -all cases, failure occurred well above the axial midplane. This is a very significant result, and is in keeping with our understanding of fuel failure mechanisms.
The second major question, i.e., the propensity for hydraulic fuel sweepout, B u t even f o r these 50t/sec simulations, i t must be acknowledged that I t should be pointed o u t , however, that the MARK-IIA t e s t vehicle was designed primarily for obtaining fuel failure-type data i n a flowing system and we are simply trying t o extract as much meaningful d a t a beyond f a i l u r e as we possibly can. which tend t o reduce the applicability of the data t o this question of sweepout, as shown i n the next VU-GRAPH.
Unfortunately, there are a t 'least two aspects of the t e s t s First, the system hydraulics of the MARK-IIA loop are significantly different from t'hat of the real reactor. The coolant velocity i s only about half that of f u l l flow FFTF conditions and the system pressure and inertial parameters are such that a given p i n failure woul perturbation t o coolant f l o w conditions i n the t e s t vehicle than under actual reactor accident conditions--thus leading t o a considerably greater propensity f o r plugging i n the test environment. low a much greater Secondly, any fuel movement which occurred i n the t e s t s had essentially no reactivity influence on the"TREAT reactor, i.e., on the power burst, whereas such motion is the controlling factor on terminating the power burst i n an actual reactor. Hence, i n many o f the-test cases, considerable overdriving took place, i.e., a large amount of m after p i n failure.
en fuel was generated I should point out, however, that despite the'fact that a considerable amount of eventual pluggingg d i d occur i n several o f the tests, i n -a l l cases the fuel was configured i n a less reactive arrangement a f t e r the t e s t s than existed prior t o failure. Hence, even under f u l l plugging conditions, such motion from several pins i n a reactor would lead t o a reduction i n the power 1 eve1 .
\
We can then swmnarize the applicability of the test results in the following VU-GRAPH. the axial midplane. Here I should point out a potential difference between fresh and irradiated pins which may not be apparent from simply observing the tests to date. 13 inches in length and had a relatively uniform microstructure throughout their length. the axial pin extremities means that the cladding may be more rapidly pressurized in these gas-bearing regions of the pins which approach or reach the melting point. This is an additional factor which, for irradiated pins, tends to solidify the case of an axial failure location well above the core midplane.
First, the axial failure location appears to be well above Since the TREAT test pins were EBR-I1 irradiated, they were only For full length pins in FFTF, the changing microstructure toward For fresh pins, so much molten fuel can be retained prior to pin failure that it is quite likely that coolant boiling will preceed cladding failure.
Since boiling will occur first at the top of the active core region, cladding dryout conditions will first occur in this region and this factor further supports the conclusion of failure near the top for fresh core conditions.
As 1 said earlier, the overall fuel movement in all of the tests was toward a less reactive configuration. still studying means of how to interpret this data as it may relate to accident However, plugging did occur and we are situations in a real reactor.
ANALYSIS INCLUDING PLUGGING
Having now looked at our base calculat in9 experimental data, we ask the question, this time--as a real-istic, y.et conservative TOP situation?" , ons, key assumDtions, and support-"What can we really defend--at accident bound for the unprotected
The following VU-GRAPH sets the stage for the models used in recent calculations in an attempt to answer this question. You may recall from an earlier VU-GRAPH that I noted our current inclusion of failure incoherency between subassemblies. However, up until now we have not explicitly allowed for an incoherence within subassemblies. Yet;' if one looks at the coolant temperature distribution across a typical subassembly in FFTF, we note, as shown on the figure, a sizeabole drop near the outer 2 or 3 rows o f pins. This difference between the coolant temperature o f the inner 50 t o 70 per cent of the pins and the outer rows i s of the order of 100°F a t steady s t a t e and could r i s e t o around 300°F a t the inception of boiling. Hence, since cladding properties are very important t o f a i l u r e for both fresh and irradiated pins, the central cluster of pins would be expected t o f a i l well before the outer rows. due t o fuel motion-since fewer pins are i n i t i a l l y involved--but i t also means a clear flow p a t h even i f fuel leaving the failed inner pins should form a total blockage a t the rupture p o i n t . This i s an extremely important point! As we see from the sketch a t the right, because of the unresolved question of fuel plugging, we have conducted a preliminary s e t of calculations wherein we assume no hydraulic fuel sweepout a t a l l , i.e., the fuel freezes i n the channel a t the axial position of cladding rupture. However, you will note that a considerable bypass flow i s possible--at least'early i n the expulsion process before the outer p i n s f a i l . This, of course, means less reactivity feedback What we are really attempting t o determine i s whether sufficient reactivity loss due t o fuel motion, flowing from h i g h worth regions of the core inside the fuel p i n t o a low worth rupture location-even w i t h o u t moving once i t moves i n t o the coolant channel--provides sufficient reactivity shutdown t o a r r e s t the power burst and prevent failure i n the outer row of pins.
Perhaps the following VU-GRAPH will help t o visualize the difference between this plugging model and the base TOP model. o f the fuel disposition i n the channel f o r the Base Model approximately 80 msec a f t e r p i n failure. You will note t h a t about 50% o f the fuel has been On the l e f t i s a sketch a r b i t r a r i l y assumed t o plate out over the region once occupied by the FCI zone b u t the other half has been hydraulically swept o u t of the active core region.
In the current plugged case model, a l l of the ejected fuel i s assumed t o p i l e up a t the rupture location, i.e., no fuel sweepout i s allowed t o occur. T h i s blockage is forced t o be highly localized. Almost full blockage, f o r t h i s case, occurs i n approximately 40 msec w i t h only a small buildup of fuel plating 2 inches systematically above and below the axial rupture s i t e .
'
The following VU-GRAPH contains the Yeact.ivity balance.for a B O G 4 case with and w i t h o u t plugging.
of half as many pins as involved i n the base case, neutronics shutdown i s You will note t h a t even for total blockage expected i n about 0.3 sec. calculations, the sodium void model was not altered, i.e., ejection of the fuel I t should be pointed out that, f o r these preliminary into the coolant stream was assumed to drive the lower sodium slug down well past the core midplane before reversing. In actuality, i n order t o be consistent I w i t h the model of plugging only i n the central region of the subassembly, i t i s doubtful t h a t any sodium void region would extend downward much below the plug.
Taking such an effect into account would mitigate the positive soidum void contribution and drive the net reactivity downward much f a s t e r .
A comparison of the power trace f o r this plugged case vs. the base case i s shown i n the following VU-GRAPH, where it i s noted t h a t even though the power reduction is slightly delayed, i t nevertheless occurs rapidly.
The following VU-GRAPH shows similar results for a range of parametric cases i n which the prime parameter was a x i a l failure location. As would be intuitively obvious, as the axial failure location is moved down toward the core midplane, the shutdown i s delayed. moved low enough, the reactivity connotations of fuel motion can be positive.
I n f a c t , i f i t i s
However, here I should re-emphasize that strong evidence suggests a h i g h axial location f o r failure. really only of academic interest.
Hence, the results from the lower f a i l u r e location i s Next I would like t o t u r n t o the fresh core. A s noted e a r l i e r , this has always been a case for concern since, as denoted on the following VU-GRAPH, 1) coolant boiling w i l l probably preceed p i n f a i l u r e , thereby 2) allowing a substantial amount of molten fuel t o squirt into a largely voided region--thus leading t o a relatively h i g h propensity f o r plugging.
I
Since e a r l i e r analysis has demonstrated the sensitivity o f such an accident sequence t o axial f a i l u r e location, i t i s important t o note from the following VU-GRAPH that the f a i l u r e is expected to occur near or a t the top of the pin. Our confidence here is bolstered primarily from the f a c t that 1) Boiling is initiated a t the Top, 2) Downward voiding i s slow relative t o the r a t e of increase i n heat flux, and 3) The available data (specifically from H2 and E4) is i n support of this content i on.
b .
Actually, as we now try to apply these results to the FFTF, a high failure location seems more certain. double that of the MARK-IIA loop and the primary loop has considerably more inertia, the rate of boiling propagation down into the core should be considered.
Since the coolant velocity in FFTF i s
We have performed some preliminary calculations for the fresh core in which we have assumed total regional plugging as in the BOC-4 case, and the message is essentially the same. Namely, it -does appear that neutronic shutdown can be obtained very rapidly--even with no hydraulic sweepout--and in fact, rapidly enough to drop the power before failure of pins in the outer rows of the subassembly will fail.
The following VU-GRAPH summarizes the conclusions for the prospects of supplying in-place cooling for the fresh core. culations our current best judgment is that the power burst can be terminated prior to voiding the outer subchannels within the affected subassemblies. Because of the full flow conditions, we should be able to demonstrate cooling fairly large planar blockages in-place even though these are heated plugs--and if cooling cannot be maintained, the bottom and sides will certainly be cooled such that the path of least resistance is upward--into a less reactive configuration.
Based on preliminary calIt should be also noted that, in contrast to LOF conditions, a potential , Finally, even for fully plugged conditions, exists to reestablish flow in the outer subchannels even if boiling cannot be prevented during the accident. a pressure of approximately 100 psi will drop across this heated plug and provide a mechanism for dislodging portions to permit some upward flow.
CONCLUSIONS
In trying to sum up this discussion, I'm sure the importance of the axial failure location must be obvious. It i s for this reason that a considerable amount of effort has been expended to determine where fuel pins of different microstructure and irradiation history would fai 1 under unprotected TOP conditions. some o f the calculational results of our new Damage Parameter correlation technique which was outlined at the recent Regulatory Technology briefing a t HEDL.
Perhaps it would be helpful, therefore, to show you once again .. .
The first VU-GRAPH represents predicted results for a moderately high
Failure is predicted to occur power pin (= 10 kw/ft peak power) in which the central restructuring region comprises about the middle half of the pin. near the top of the central void region, with a shaded error band extending approximately -+ 3 inches from that point. The second VU-GRAPH represents a high power (12.5 kw/ft peak power) pin in which the central void region extends nearly the full length of the pin. occur at the top of the pin--again with an error band of approximately 6 inches. The damage parameter for the lower half o f the pin continually drops off and is not plotted.
Here the failure is predicted to
The essential message is clear: Pin failures are expected to occur well above the axial midplane and may--for the hottest pins--occur very near or at the top of the active core region. If we now retur'n to the earlier VU-GRAPH which contined the general accident path tree, we can hopefully view the overall situation from a better perspective.
I
Both analytical and experimental evidence strongly supports the position that we do -not expect central axial failure locations.
expect an accident path down the right side of this VU-GRAPH to be extremely improbable. did hypothesize massive failures near the midplane, the reactivity insertion due to fuel rapidly moving toward the core centerline would be limited to the neighborhood o f a hundred dollars/sec. Such conditions, although arising from a different mechanism, were considered in the PSAR and the eventual energy yield was fairly modest-even though it employed a very pessimistic conversion of thermal energy to work energy--mainly because a NA-In equation of state is controlling for such situations.
Hence, we would It might be helpful to point out, however, that even if one Turning our attention to the left side o f the VU-GRAPH, therefore, I hope it is apparent that there exists a much stronger possibility for terminating the unprotected TOP accident in "Phase I" than in the case o f the LOF. There is a strong indication that enough reactivity loss can be obtained due to fuel motion from high worth to low worth regions to terminate the power burst-even if hydraulic sweepout does not occur! combined with the failure incoherency witohin s'ubassemblies, 'implies a strong This observation, case for demonstrating in-place cooling following the excursion. be clearly emphasized that much larger blockages can be cooled under full flow conditions than is the case for LOF conditions.
It should
Even though we expect substantial hydraulic sweepout o f fuel, we have shown that a considerable amount o f localized plugging can be tolerated. Even if total plugs were to form in individual subassemblies, however, the whole core would not necessarily get into the boiling pool resulting from the "Transition Phase". conditions might be postulated to occur due to those subassemblies which do loose their geometry, the relatively higher net reactivity at such a time would tend to reduce the recriticality ramp rate, on a per subassembly basis, below that of the LOF.
And even under these conditions, whatever recriticality Before concluding, it is perhaps worth noting, as shown in the following VU-GRAPH, that very little fuel is expected to be removed from the core, under TOP conditions, to burden post-accident heat removal requirements outside the core. For base case calculations, in which substantial hydraulic fuel sweepout i s expected, only about 3% of the original fuel inventory is computed to leave the active core prior to permanent neutronic shutdown. If we postulate the type of plugging discussed today, i.e., solid plugging at the rupture location for the hot central pins within the failed subassemblies, the total fuel reaching the coolant channel may be as high as 10%. been postulated to plug, very little o f this would eventually be carried thoughout the vessel. subassemblies, a transition phase similar to the LOF would be entered and the demand upon the PAHR system.would be comparable to that case.
However, since it has
I
In the extreme case of solid plugging throughout the The final VU-GRAPH smarizes our conclusions on the TOP accident sequence.
First early termination appears to be by far the most likely sequence. Substantial shutdown is expected from fuel sweepout--especial ly for irradiated cores--but such sweepout is not essential to the conclusions.
Secondly, failure incoherency within the subassemblies--combined with It should be early shutdown--provides a strong case for in-place cooling.
noted that a substantially larger blockage is allowable with the pumps on than is the case for LOF conditions. Finally, the above arguments are believed to greatly mitigate the concern for core recompaction leading to a potential recriticality. a hypothesis, however, the only mechanistic path envisioned possible for such an event i s via a massive plugging process which would lead to a transiEven under such tion phase.
It should be remembered that very large insertion rates were considered in the calculations which led to the 150 MW-sec work energy design basis, and it i s very difficult "to envision any mechanistic path which would lead to ramp rates larger than those already considered. path envisioned to lead to a potential gradual core meltdown is via a massive plugging process. As unlikely as this is, as noted from todays discussion, such an event would lead to a transition-type phase in a manner not dissimilar to the conditions already considered within the context of the LOF accident sequence.
In fact, the only mechanistic I hope that this discussion helps to place into better perspective the role o f the unprotected TOP accident in the overall question of FFTF core energet i cs .
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